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# I. THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR

1. The outbreak of the war was so unexpected to the entire country both in its forms and its tempo, that the Army Command and the local party and Soviet authorities were thrown into utter confusion and had no time to seriously organize the people for the coming struggle behind the enemy lines. The panic was so great that all the local leaders thought only of escaping before the Germans came. Only in a small number of districts did the District Committees of the party, acting on their own initiative, leave behind certain party members for work in the rear of the enemy. These party members later established contacts with each other, and drawing a part of the population into the work, organized fighting units.
2. Similarly, a number of the local officers of the NKVD<sup>\*)</sup> had not had time to leave their agents behind. However, even agents who remained behind did not play any active role, but lived quietly through the occupation, confining themselves to compiling blacklists of all persons who had in any measure cooperated with the Germans. But sometimes these agents aided people who arrived from the other side of the front and helped them to contact "reliable patriots."
3. On the whole, the appearance in the enemy's rear of numerous armed peasant groups during the early months of the war was a purely spontaneous phenomenon. Many of these groups, moreover, were little more than simple bandit gangs. Basically, the groups consisted of young peasants, soldiers who escaped into the forest after their units were surrounded, and also of people who saw an opportunity for looting and enrichment in the prevailing chaos. Only units which were joined by the local intellectuals, such as school teachers and agronomists, engaged in struggle against the enemy by means of diversionary acts, sabotage and terrorism. They obtained arms from the retreating army, but these arms were very primitive and useful only for small-scale attacks on houses where the Germans engaged in drinking bouts, on small storehouses and on German soldiers who had accidentally strayed from their units. All these acts were conducted by the guerrillas on their own, without any leadership and without coordination between the

\*) The present Ministry of the Interior was known as the NKVD up to March, 1946. Both designations are used in this report.

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various detachments. There were even cases when the detachments, meeting in the forests, open fire upon each other, suspecting a trap on the part of the Germans.

4. Despite the noisy propaganda in the press, the government did not regard the patriots in the enemy's rear as a serious force, especially since it had no contact with them and therefore could not direct their activities. However, this spontaneous resistance movement convinced the government that there were people on the other side of the fighting lines who might be of considerable value in the fight against the Germans and who might help in diversionary activity and in destroying enemy communications if they were contacted and directed through trusted agents. By this time the command decided to send a large number of loyal persons as diversionists for the demolition of those bridges and strategic points which the retreating Germans had not had time to blow up and which were now proving of great value to the Germans as means of communication with their distant bases. It also decided to use the detachments active in the rear to help these diversionists in their work.

## II. THE ORGANIZATION OF SCHOOLS FOR DIVERSIONISTS AND SCOUTS, AND THE CREATION OF SPECIAL SQUADS.

5. Toward the end of July and in August, 1941, a call for volunteers went out to the Comsomol youth in the war factories and schools. The volunteers were to be sent to districts under German occupation for dynamiting and terrorist work. Party and Comsomol cells were instructed to launch an intense propaganda campaign and arouse patriotism in order to attract the largest possible number of volunteers. And their number was great indeed. In the Dzerzhinsky district alone (there are 22 such districts in Moscow) 1100 volunteers registered in response to the call, and the total for Moscow exceeded 10 thousand. All the volunteers were members of the party and the Comsomol, between the ages of 18 and 28, with at least 7 years of elementary school education. They regarded this dangerous work as something interesting and romantic, and many were also prompted by preference for diversionist work to service at the front, to which they were subject in any case in view of their age and which seemed to them much more dangerous.
6. All registrants were carefully screened by organs of the NKVD, which questioned each applicant about his entire family, his parents' occupations before the revolution, the possible existence of relatives abroad, and so forth. The answers were then checked with the files of the NKVD, and only one fourth of the registrants was accepted for secret assignments, while the rest were told to await the second call.
7. [redacted] knows of only two schools in existence at that time in Moscow: a school for scouts, and a school for diversionists. Both were under the jurisdiction of NKVD departments and were under martial law. These schools were located in the "Dynamo" Stadium, on the Leningrad highway in the Petrovsk Park, which belongs to the Ministry of the Interior and which was closed to public sports from the first days of the war. There the volunteers, selected according to their political reliability, were subjected to thorough medical examination. The physical requirements were very high; in addition to native physical endowments, they included athletic training, endurance and tenacity. These requirements were answered most closely by professional athletes, as well as the students of special sport institutes and technical schools. Consequently, the athletes comprised 25-28% of the total number of persons selected for training at the schools.
8. Applicants who passed the medical tests were given military uniforms and assigned to dormitories and school auditoriums set up for them on the stadium grounds. They were divided into sections and platoons, designated as communications sections, scout platoons, dynamiting companies, and so forth, according to their tasks. The 300-hour training program (30 school days of ten hours each) were devoted to the following studies: a) topography and orientation by the compass and natural tokens; b) radio communication; c) explosives and their uses in diversion; d) military intelligence and espionage, and the system of their organization in the rear; e) weapons and their use; f) cryptography and codes; g) signalling by bird-songs; h) current events and the political character of the rear. These subjects were taught by professors

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of the regular military schools of the Ministry of the Interior and certain specialists from the Military Academies. Since in selecting the students preference was given to persons with high-school or college education, the program consisted of brief courses in theory and subsequent emphasis on practice.

9. Every morning all students were put through intensive physical training: running, jumping, grenade-throwing, overcoming obstacles and weight-lifting. These were followed by breakfast. Then four hours of uninterrupted theoretical studies. After lunch the students engaged in practical studies in orientation and topography, camouflage, organization of diversions and other subjects. For this they took trips to the country, where there were natural objectives, and learnt their subjects by practice under the guidance of the instructors. On their return, they were again assembled in the auditorium, where they were given lectures in current events, taught how to select the people they could depend on behind the German lines and how to judge the degree of their trustworthiness. In the evenings they studied radio.
10. Thirty days proved insufficient for the entire program, and the term was extended by another 12 days. After they mastered their subjects, the students were given a short course in parachute jumping and were dropped two or three times from the training planes. The final examinations were held before high-ranking members of the Ministry of the Interior, and the graduation ceremony was attended by the 2nd Secretary of the Moscow Party Organization, Popov, who delivered a long speech which was meant to inspire the future diversionists to self-sacrificing work for party and people...
11. The next step was the formation of detachments. The commanders appointed to lead them were communists of long party experience and irreproachable past, who had distinguished themselves in their work by initiative, courage, and loyalty to the party. Inasmuch as the basic tasks of these detachments consisted of diversion and reconnaissance, it was preferred that the commander be a person with technical training or a specialist in military-espionage reconnaissance, according to the aims with which the detachments were being sent to the rear. As a rule, they were also volunteers who requested the Central Committee of the Party in Moscow to assign them to this type of service. After a careful checking of their records by the NKVD, the entire material on them was sent to the Central Committee of the Party, which finally approved each detachment commander and assigned him to a district of operations. The political commissars for the detachments were chosen from among party and Soviet leaders who had managed to escape from the districts they directed before the occupation and who were thoroughly familiar with the terrain of the area where the detachment was being sent and with the local people with whom they would have to deal. In addition to these, the posts of commissar were given to party workers of the Moscow organizational apparatus who had served before the war as instructors, propagandists, lecturers, and who had wide party experience and an unblemished past. The detachment commander and the commissar selected their people in the school, having come to know them during the month and a half of common study and choosing those who, they felt, satisfied the all-round requirements.
12. The detachments consisted of 40 to 80 people; these were divided into a communications section, a scout squad, a mine-layers' and dynamiters' squad, a sharpshooters' squad, and a quartermaster. The command consisted of 3 or 4 persons: the commander, the commissar, and the chief of staff. Thus, for instance, the detachment under the engineer Lynkov, who became known among the partisans as "Baty" ("Daddy") and later became famous throughout Russia and was awarded the Order of Hero of the Soviet Union, consisted of 54 persons; 16 radio men, 2 nurses-radio operators, 5 scouts, 12 specialists-dynamiters, 1 quartermaster, and the rest - privates. Of the latter, 12 were professional athletes and former members of sports organizations or students of sports schools. Each group of this detachment formed a section or squad, which was led by a group-commander subject to the detachment commander.
13. Practically all the detachments were transported to the German rear in September and the beginning of October, 1941. They were transported by the Division of long-range bombers TB-3, which were also loaded with explosives, arms, radio-apparatus, instruments, ammunition, canned foods, medical supplies, etc. Thus,

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Lyakov's detachment was transported by planes with a total carrying capacity of 20 tons.

### III. LANDING THE DETACHMENTS AND THE TASKS CONFRONTING THEM

14. The most suitable points for partisan activity are forested areas where it is both easy to hide and to set up entire living camps. The landings were therefore made in such areas, including the Bryansk forests, the Bakhmach district, Sumy, Zhitomir, Shepetovka. In addition, these points were situated near strategic communication lines and important railroad junctions through which passed a large part of the German troop and ammunition transports. About 50% of all the diversionists were dropped in the area of the Bryansk forests, from where they subsequently made their way to their assigned points.
15. What were the assignments set before these detachments? Their first task was to find in these areas the people who had been left behind by the communist organizations for underground work, to establish liaison with them, and with their aid to find loyal patriots willing to launch a struggle against the German occupants. Where no people had been left by the organization, the detachment commanders were advised to contact the chairmen of the kolkhozes or village soviets, village communists, teachers, young agronomists graduated from Soviet institutes, and kolkhoz activists. However, they were to confine their contacts only to party members. There were many such party members left in the villages, and the Germans did not molest them up to the day of their retreat. It is true that many communists began to ardently collaborate with the Germans, some to save their skins, others for political considerations; the new arrivals therefore had to be careful in approaching even these people, and to reveal themselves only after carefully checking their trustworthiness. The checked and selected people were to be added to the detachment and also utilized for espionage and intelligence. As spies it was recommended to use young girls who studied in the ten-year schools or worked in the district government bureaus. Only members of the Goscomsol were to be used in this work. Their task was to maintain friendships with Russians who went into German service and with Germans themselves, from whom they were to obtain information as to the plans of the local garrison units; they were also charged with watching the roads over which passed the German mobile units, to strike up friendships with German soldiers billeted nearby and obtain all available information from them.
16. After the detachment augmented its ranks from among the local population and created a network of spies and scouts, it was ready to start action. But the first requirement was the maintenance of liaison with the front and with the center of diversionist work in Moscow, which was later transformed into the Staff of the partisan movement. The instructions were that the center was to be informed of all actions, all successes and failures of the detachment and all plans, and that no action was to be undertaken without previous approval from the center. Moreover, all data obtained by the agents concerning troop movements and armament were to be immediately relayed to the staff of the front sector where it took place.
17. Moscow generally needed information on what was taking place behind the enemy lines, for without such knowledge it was difficult to make any strategic plans. The commanders were also ordered to report about all the groups and detachments active in the rear, so that the center might be able to fill the numerous blank spots on its maps. Such blank spots abounded up to 1943, and frequently people sent from the center to these areas found whole armed detachments which they mistook for groups of German provocateurs and from which they fled. For instance, the diversionist Zabelov, sent to the Bakhmach district in 1942, was told that he would find there only armed enemies, and no friends; in reality, several partisan detachments were operating there, frequently attacking the Germans.
18. The objectives of diversionist activity included railroad bridges, stations, junctions, traffic bridges over rivers, arms and ammunition depots, troop barracks, officers' clubs, motion picture theatres, single automobiles, etc. In actions endangering the life of the dynamiter himself, it was recommended that a local person be used, so that the group sent from the center might be preserved intact.

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19. Besides military strategic tasks, there were also political ones. It was necessary to instill in the population faith that the Red Army would soon return to those areas, that the Soviet Government was still strong and capable of winning the war. Those who had lost this faith and entered into collaboration with the enemy were to be ruthlessly punished, preferably hanged in the villages as an example to those who had not yet gone into German service.
20. The final paragraph of the instructions stated that it was impossible to foresee all conditions under which the detachments would have to work; that new, unexpected objectives might be discovered on the spot, and that such situations called for initiative, courage, decision and readiness to sacrifice all for the Fatherland. Incidentally, in order to make sure of such loyalty and sacrifice, each detachment was assigned 3 or 4 agents who remained unknown even to the commander; these agents were instructed to quietly eliminate all who deviated from the required standards.
21. Finally, the diversionists were landed. And here suddenly everything proved unexpected and fraught with difficulty. For most of the detachments were dropped within a radius of 150-200 kilometers from their objectives. Those who were to be dropped over Balzhach found themselves near Bryansk... The landing operations were conducted at night, when the pilots could not correct their course by the lay of the land but had to make their computations blindly, by their instruments. As a result of the pilot's error by 2 degrees, the detachment commander Lynkov found himself 100 km. from his objective, utterly alone; it took him six months to assemble a part of his detachment and set to work.
22. In addition to this initial difficulty, the entire occupied territory proved full of surprises. There was probably no other country under German occupation which had such chaos, treason, collaboration with the enemy, so many different bands and groupings as existed in Russia and especially in the Ukraine. There were the followers of Bonderov and of Vlassov, nationalists, Ukrainian separatists, Cossack riots, plain bandits, and so on. It would require a separate report to analyze all the movements and trends among the Russian population in occupied areas during the war years in order to see how absurd are the assertions of the Soviet leaders that the country is a monolithic union of all nationalities. As a result of the war, 5 republics have been liquidated (only 3 were mentioned in the official press), over 35% of the population of the other republics which had been under occupation had been deported to Siberia, and countless traitors have been shot in mass executions. The present author, who moved westward with the army, saw with his own eyes the punishment meted out to the Ukrainian population by NKVD troops. NKVD units followed the advancing front and, breaking into each populated point, hanged the leaders and carried out mass arrests of all who were in any measure involved in collaborationist activity. In the winter of 1944-1945 the jails of the Ukraine were bursting with prisoners, who had to be sent to Siberia on foot, without shoes, loaded by the constant blows of rifle butts.
23. It was necessary to mention these facts in order to make clear the actual situation in which the diversionists found themselves upon being dropped from the planes. Wandering in the forest in search of his comrades, division commander Lynkov had several times stumbled upon forest partisans who took him either for a German provocateur or for an agent of the NKVD. Once he met two members of a detachment of "okruzhentzi" (soldiers of armies which had been surrounded by German troops and had scattered in the forest to escape capture). Learning that they were former Red Army soldiers, he was overjoyed and asked their help in carrying out his mission. But the soldiers nearly killed him when they heard that he had just arrived from Moscow, declaring that they occupied themselves with brigandage and had no intention to defend the bankrupt government.
24. In the same forest there was another detachment, whose aims were closer to those of Lynkov. When he met them, they did not believe that he had been sent to Moscow, which, in their opinion, had no time just then to think of such distant places in the rear. To test his identity, they asked him what was Stalin's birthplace. He named a city in the Caucasus, but one of the soldiers declared that Stalin was born in Gorky, near Moscow. Again he was about to be shot, but was able to escape once more. And only when he began a search in the villages for former activists from the party cells, did he find people who believed his documents and oaths. These people helped him to find his comrades, and Lynkov began to carry out his diversionary activities. He chose villages situated in a remote area adjoining the forest, where no Germans had as yet set foot, announced the mobilization of all men of military age, divided them into sections and squads, and declared that henceforth they would be regarded as partisan-militiamen called up to fight the Germans. Soon afterwards, when the detachment increased to 200 men, they set to

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work. They attacked the district center, blew up small bridges, broke into stations and dynamited entire ammunition trains, attacked village police stations and killed the police "traitors" (during the occupation all police units consisted of Russians).

25. Most of the detachments underwent similar experiences, and they were all organized in the rear in the same manner. Many of the groups, failing to assemble their own members, joined other detachments. The largest partisan units, under Kovpak, who was twice decorated with the Order of Hero of the Soviet Union and later raised to the rank of Major General, absorbed the greatest number of such groups. Kovpak himself, who had organized his detachment on his own initiative during the very first months of the war, evinced great abilities in organization and leadership of men and showed himself to be a cunning and courageous guerrilla. His fame soon reached Moscow, which began to send him many people trained in special schools, as well as ammunition and other supplies needed in his work.
26. The large detachments were soon given more important assignments. In 1942 Stalin himself received some commanders of partisan detachments and set them various tasks. Kovpak was ordered to make a raid on the right bank of the Dni per and there try to disorganize the whole German rear. Others were instructed to remain near the front and directly aid the fighting Red Army by means of diversions hampering the transport of ammunition and men for the German Army. However, this took place in 1942, when the partisan movements were brought under the jurisdiction of a special central staff which directed all the schools and the men behind the German lines. But more of this later.
27. The NKVD retained its own spy system and its own diversionists, who formed no detachments, but acted with especial secrecy and by themselves, reporting only to Moscow. It also retained jurisdiction over the series of schools which trained these diversionists. One of these schools, which is of special interest, was the school for women scouts.

#### IV. WOMEN SCOUTS.

28. In the winter of 1942 the author took part in transporting by air a large group of young women, who were being sent to the enemy's rear for espionage and intelligence work. A large shipment of automatic parachutes arrived at the airfield where our unit was stationed, and soon afterwards the girls arrived by train. After one or two training jumps from low heights, they were taken to the German rear. They were divided into small groups of 5 or 6, under the leadership of experienced NKVD workers. From talks with these girls we learnt that they were recruited in July or August, 1941, from schools and war factories. They were all members of the Comsomol, came from working-class families, and distinguished themselves by their discipline and loyalty to the Soviet Government. All those selected had excellent recommendations from their party or Comsomol cells, and were admitted to the school for scouts after careful screening by the NKVD and the medical commission. There were several such schools in Moscow, and they were housed in the buildings of the regular high-schools, a number of which were closed to the former students and placed at the disposal of the War Ministry and the NKVD. In the conversation, the girls mentioned the 73rd and the 141st Schools in Moscow.
29. In the reconnaissance schools the girls were put through a 3-months' course of study; the curriculum included German, radio and communication, codes, weapons (revolver and grenade) and their use, military documents and their significance, current events and athletic exercises. They were taught by professors from the special NKVD schools and some specialists in radio-communication from the Military Academy and the Intelligence Division of the General Staff.
30. On graduating, all students gave their solemn oath and signature to reveal nothing of what they had been taught at the school and to faithfully perform all tasks set before them. To further guarantee their loyalty, hostages remained in Moscow the persons of their parents and relatives. These scouts were dropped over the districts of Rzhev, Volikiye Lukl, Smolensk, Kursk, Belgorod, Kharkov, etc. They were to work in the German officers' clubs and restaurants, and some of them were to enter the German brothels; the latter were distinguished by beauty and gay surroundings. They showed little gaiety, however, after they were landed, and on meeting one of them in Moscow in 1944, [redacted] learnt that more than half of them were caught by the Germans and perished. Some of them lost their courage and were eliminated (shot) by their own agents, and only 25-30% managed to establish contacts with Germans and obtain some information. As a rule, they became the mistresses of commandants, rear officers, club managers, etc., and acted through them. Of the six girls dropped by our plane only one returned; one was killed in

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the fall, one was captured by the Germans, one was shot by the representative of the NKVD (she had been raped by the Germans, became insane and began to "talk"); one was killed by the Germans during the retreat, then the head of the group was captured, and only one lived to return.

31. One of the girls from the same school, nicknamed "Malina", killed the commandant of the entire Byelorussia; she cut off his head and brought it in a sack to the Germans. To avenge this act, the Germans shot 15,000 inhabitants of the city of Minsk, and therefore "Malina" received no rewards or honors for a long time. Afterwards the Germans raised a noisy campaign concerning the Soviet policy of sending young girls as spies into Brothels, and the policy was apparently discontinued.

#### V. EXPANSION OF THE PARTISAN MOVEMENT IN 1942-43.

32. In the beginning of 1942, the gaps in the map of the German rear rapidly began to fill up. The parachutists sent to these areas radioed the results of their reconnaissance which indicated that approximately 1200 guerrilla detachments were active behind the enemy lines (this figure is taken from the reminiscences of one of the scouts). This convinced the government of the necessity to seriously utilize these detachments by sending them experienced and reliable people who would assume leadership and direct their activities in the required channels. By this time Stalin signed an order creating a Central Staff of the Partisan Movement. Marshal Voroshilov was appointed Commander in Chief, and Ponomarenko (leader of the Byelorussian Communists) was named Chief of Staff. They were placed in charge of the partisan detachments and the schools which were training new contingents of reinforcements. All detachments which had radios and maintained communication with Moscow were given new ciphers and codes, which were henceforth to be used in orders from the center and in reports that the partisans were to send daily to the staff headquarters regarding their work. The staff also began to assign the detachments various operational tasks coordinated with the needs of the fronts. To assist in the execution of these missions the staff sent the partisans ammunition, explosives, arms, men, clothing and food. Different detachments pooled their energies to building landing strips in the fields for the heavily loaded "Dobryshkas" which brought supplies from Moscow and took back the wounded and the various loot captured from the Germans.
33. The work of the detachments was becoming more or unified and effective. Their chief objectives were railroad lines, junctions and bridges. The Bryansk railroad junction alone was the scene of a concentration of 80 detachments organized into a single partisan center. Each detachment, however, had a strictly defined "sphere of influence", in which it blew up entire transports of supplies and German troops. The Germans perfected the technique of rebuilding blasted lines, bringing the repair time down to 8 or 10 hours, but they never succeeded in organizing any effective method of fighting the diversions. The latter were scattered and concentrated in the impenetrable depths of the Bryansk forests, whence they dispatched small groups of men to different sections of the railroad, and whence they could not be driven out by any "combing" of the forest. And the larger detachments, such as Lynkov's, which then counted more than 250 persons, acted in squads of five, which were sent far from their base for long periods, and with which infrequent contact was maintained, mainly for the purpose of supplying them with explosives.
34. In addition to these detachments, there appeared new groups of diversionsists, organized by the commands of the various fronts on their own initiative. These were either left behind in the retreat or carried across the front lines by plane. Most of the members of these groups were scouts who had undergone a ten-day training course before being sent to the rear. This course dealt with only one subject: military intelligence and diversion in the rear. Thus, in June 1942, in the region of the Bryansk forests, on the "small land", 130x170 km. in area and belonging to partisans, there landed the group of Major Virshigora, who subsequently took over command of Kovpak's legendary division. The group was sent by the Bryansk front for purposes of reconnaissance and diversion. The instructions read to them before they were sent off to the enemy's rear warned them to refrain from all contact with the population and not to reveal themselves, since the area swarmed with traitors. This group had its own agents, who kept watch 24 hours a day at the approaches to railroad stations and reported to the front intelligence on all passing transports. Not having sufficient strength for an attack upon the station, they demolished all the approaches to it, creating a tie-up, then radioed back for assistance. Virshigora's group consisted of a company of scouts and two women radio operators; in August, 1942, they all joined Kovpak's detachment.

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35. This experience was shared by other groups dropped behind the German lines by the Russian fronts. Only a small percentage made their way back to their units across the front lines, and the rest joined various guerrilla detachments.
36. In the middle of the summer of 1942 Moscow decided to send a large detachment far into the rear - to the right bank of the Dnieper, where there was relatively little resistance to the Germans and where many had begun to accept the occupation and collaborate with the enemy.
37. The commanders of the large detachments were called to a conference in Moscow. In addition to the legendary Kovpak, there came Saburov - the hero of the Bryansk forests, Smolyutin - commander of a 650-man detachment, Duka, Pokrovsky and others. They were generously rewarded, showered with gifts and received by Stalin himself. He encouraged them, thanked them for their valuable help, and then began to discuss new tasks. The large detachments were advised to continue their work in the same spirit, expanding into districts further west. But Kovpak's detachment was ordered to make a large-scale raid on the right boundary of the Ukraine, to capture a part of Western Ukraine and reach the Carpathians. By this time Kovpak's detachment, 5000 strong, consisted of 4 subdivisions of 8 companies each, with scout squads, miners' sections, and a quartermaster corps. The first battalion also had a sapper platoon and a radio junction.
38. In September this large military unit started out, and in November it made a forced march across the Dnieper. The appearance of this division was so sudden and effective that the population began to talk about a break-through of the front by the Red Army, and some people broke into panic flight. Wherever the detachment passed, it looted German depots and distributed the food to the population, hanged all police and all Ukrainian traitors, and did everything possible to win over the people - such was Stalin's order. It also destroyed numerous communications and junctions. The most brilliant operation was its smashing of the Sarna Cross (a junction of many railroads and highways connecting with Kiev, Rovno, Baranovichi, etc.); and the day of Sarna itself, the detachment blew up all the bridges and large sections of the roads. Small groups detailed by the detachment put on police armbands, broke into villages and killed all traitors. Many of the Russian mayors appointed by the Germans came of their own will, pleading their guilt and offering their services; some of them were hanged and some, thoroughly intimidated, were left in their places. But at this time, at the beginning of 1943, the Germans had developed the policy of using Ukrainians for fighting in the rear. They assembled volunteers from the pre-war camps for consack detachments to do garrison duty in the rear. There proved to be a great number of volunteers (most of them bitter enemies of the Soviet Government) and they distinguished themselves by unbelievable cruelty to the partisans who disturbed their current prosperous and free existence. The volunteers included middle rank officers who had graduated from Soviet schools, Moscow workers, conscripts, and many of the various nationalities who had served in the Red Army and voluntarily deserted to the German side.
39. Kovpak's detachment launched a fight to the death against these volunteer divisions, but the latter were too numerous and fought so stubbornly that the partisans did not succeed in destroying them and had to circle around them in order to proceed. In addition to open fights, the guerrillas went to these consacks girl-spies or lists among the local population. These girls lured them to drinking parties, where they were caught by the partisans. The partisans also used other tried methods; they stole into the enemy's offices and headquarters, planted delayed action mines, and soon both the buildings and the people in it were blown to bits. In one instance, they blew up a "Labor Bureau" which was recruiting the local working population for deportation to Germany and which was guarded by consack units.
40. In other districts the detachment encountered new Gestapo tricks. On learning of the advent of the partisans, the local Gestapo and police officers dismissed all Russian employees who had become known for especial cruelty in dealing with the recalcitrant population, announcing the dismissals as an act aimed to benefit the population. However, the dismissed men, aided by the police, organized gangs and began to hang and massacre all who fell into their hands. When the population began to complain against these atrocities, the German authorities said that they would gladly help, but they had no troops for the purpose. If the population, they added, would take up arms against these various bandits and partisans, then there might be some peace in their districts. And the population took up arms and opened a war on the partisans and the bandits. Kovpak's detachment lost many people in these battles until he succeeded in convincing the population of the difference between his men and the bandits.

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41. Generally, the detachment encountered a great number of surprises, traps and provocations on the part of the Gestapo. But despite these, the raid was successful. The partisans blew up many bridges, destroyed many communication junctions, killed hundreds of Germans, and disrupted numerous telephones and telegraph lines. They also obtained much valuable information which was immediately transmitted, over the radio or through liaison planes, to Moscow and the various front-line staff headquarters. Thus, Kovpak's partisans downed the plane which carried all the operational resumes and the plans of the headquarters of Kleist's army. These documents were relayed to Moscow, which found them very valuable and generously rewarded the partisans for this feat.
42. Kovpak's raid was important in other respects as well. In almost all the districts passed by the detachment there sprang up new partisan units which began to fight the Germans. The raid also restored faith in the return of the Soviet Government.
43. The detachment subsequently proceeded to the Western Ukraine and Poland, reaching as far as Warsaw. It was reconstituted into a large military division, equipped with a battery and several tanks, and maintaining a permanent contact with Moscow, which continually supplied it with ammunition. In addition to ammunition and supplies, Kovpak's army was given a special representative from the Central Committee of the Party, Syromolotov, whose position was equivalent to that of a member of the Military Soviet of the Front - the highest-ranking party commissar.
44. The other detachments, most of which remained in their native districts, also expanded every year. Their functions multiplied as their membership grew, and sometimes they took part in regular front operations; they prepared air fields for the landing of large divisions of the Red Army, blockaded whole districts, and gave direct aid to the fronts. The smaller detachments continued their work of diversion, blowing up trains, and so forth.

#### VI. POSSIBLE EMPLOYMENT OF PARTISAN WARFARE IN A FUTURE WAR.

45. The war has yielded a vast store of experience with regard to various forms of partisan struggle, methods of organizing partisan units, and systems of preparation and training. This experience was carefully and constantly studied by the Soviet Command and the question of possible utilization of partisan warfare in a future war will be decided - has probably been decided already - on the basis of this study. The principal question here is the relative value of the two basic types of partisan organization and the possible use of both or the preference of one over the other. One of these types is the partisan unit which sprang up more or less spontaneously as an expression of popular resistance and was later gradually brought under the direction of the Red Army Command. The other type is represented by the detachments which were thoroughly trained beforehand and which operated from the very first under instructions from the center. The problem involves not only the relative usefulness of these types of partisan detachments, but also the accompanying conditions and results of their activity. In this respect, the partisan units of the former type have not proven desirable in every respect, for they created much friction and even disorders, particularly during the winding-up of their operations.
46. To the partisans themselves the end of the war and generally the end of their activities brought many disappointments and aroused much discontent. As soon as the Red Army entered a new district, where the partisans had hitherto been active, the latter were immediately required to surrender their arms and either enter the regular army or go to work in the kolchozes. But more than 3 years of life in the forests, where they had been entirely on their own and done practically whatever they pleased, bred in the partisans a certain independence and unruliness. The Soviet Government, which had always fought these qualities, began to combat them in the partisans as well.
47. Thus, in the spring of 1944, after the liberation of the Leningrad region, all partisans who operated in the area behind the enemy lines were called to a conference in Leningrad. The resulting spectacle was rather curious and quite unpleasant both to the government and the population. The city was invaded by armed tramps who had acquired a taste for looting, murder, and all sorts of lawlessness. They were dressed in the motley uniforms and costumes of assorted European and Soviet armies. Having listened to the high-flown speeches of the regional leaders, they asked what rewards they would receive for their deeds and how they would now live. They were

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told that it was still necessary to finish off the enemy on his own territory and then begin to rebuild their homeland.

48. Neither answer was very satisfactory to the partisans. Emerging into the street, they broke into the newly opened commercial stores in which the best wares were gathered and began to loot. First of all they made for the alcoholic drinks. After a day of drinking, they turned in the evening to robbing the civilian population. They held up passers-by and took their coats and watches, raped women, transformed small restaurants into places of riotous orgy. For two days the entire city was in a state of total chaos. The residents were afraid to set foot in the streets, the police hid in the barracks, the stores that escaped looting remained closed. It was not until the morning of the third day that an NKVD division, called up from its garrison, managed to curb the partisans and drive them out of the city after carefully disarming them. The ringleaders paid for the riot with their lives.
49. Even greater and longer-lasting anarchy was created by the partisans in the Ukraine. Learning what the returned government intended to do with them, they preferred to remain in the forests and continue their lawless existence. Up to the end of 1945, the forests of the Ukraine swarmed with partisans, and the NKVD was forced to carry on almost the same struggle against them as had been waged by the Germans.
50. After this experience, it is hardly likely that in a future war Moscow would be willing to set up an extensive network of partisan detachments out of the local population. But there is no doubt that even in peace-time the government will maintain its system of partisan schools for the youth of the urban centers and increase the number of specially trained diversionists, who remained throughout fully obedient to their leaders and showed irreproachable discipline.

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